Although 70-80% of problems have some component of human error, its overall contribution to many problems may be small; studies of complex systems have revealed that up to 85 % are primarily due to deficiencies in the lay-out and processes of the system. The anaesthetist has to operate in a complex system; many problems originate from deficiencies in this system.
and application of the philosophy and principles of CQI throughout a system; it has been described as a structured, systematic process for creating organisation-wide participation in planning and implementing continuous improvements in quality.
Analysis of the mechanisms by which poor products are produced led to the conclusion that problems are usually 85070 system-based, and that only a small percentage are due solely to poor performance or error by human beings. '·4 Thus, although "human error" plays some role in 70-80% of problems,5 the direct contribution of any individual worker to most problems is relatively small. This is entirely consistent with the proposition elsewhere in this symposium that "latent errors" or "contributing factors" play an important role in the genesis of incidents and accidents; Inlensive Care Unit FtGURE I: A schematic representation of some of the factors which may influence the clinical practice of anaesthesia. The anaesthetist relies on many "upstream" processes being properly carried out. The shaded portion represents the sea of variables through which the anaesthetist is required to navigate (after Runciman 10 ) .
an act by an individual, although the immediate precursor of an accident, may be only the final ingredient of several required to turn an incident into an accident.' Indeed, the "prime cause" of an incident or accident in the workplace is often a systembased problem. (,' As has been emphasised by Gaba' the modern anaesthetist is part of a complex, dynamic system involving not only the patient, but the surgeon, other co-workers, an array of equipment and a complex infrastructure. Some of the elements which need to be in place for a simple anaesthetic are shown in Figure I. 10 Problems "upstream" in any of the five categories in Figure I may sow the seed for a disaster during an anaesthetic. All too often, factors in several of these categories conspire together to set the scene for a problem, and the unsuspecting anaesthetist may simply be the final conduit for a disaster before it strikes the patient. At a more mundane level, an anaesthetist may have to work hard and be very vigilant to achieve an acceptable outcome simply because the system is full of deficiencies.
The anaesthetist is also part of a larger system incorporating the professional bodies, standards organizations, medical defence organizations and agencies of the State and Federal Governments. Remedies to problems often have to involve components of this larger system. Incident monitoring is an excellent way of finding out what is going wrong with the system, and hence may be used as a basic tool for implementing CQI or TQM; it may be regarded as one of the afferent limbs or information gathering components of a quality improvement cycle. III It was decided to try to assess the contribution of system-based problems to the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS), to define the "system" from the perspective of AIMS and CQI, and to identify some aspects of clinical anaesthetic practice which require attention,
METHODS
Information of relevance to system failure was extracted from the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS. AIMS involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Details of the AIMS reporting form and methods are provided elsewhere in this symposium." The AIMS database was searched for all reports among the first 2000 incidents which contained any points "ticked" by reporters of relevance to "system-based" problems among the lists in "Item 4" on the report form ("factors contributing", "factors minimizing" and "suggested corrective strategies"; see Figure I , p. 523 "). Many of the relevant incidents were analysed in detail, and the data presented elsewhere in this symposium were examined to identify aspects of clinical practice which require attention. The reporting pathways for AIMS were reviewed to try to define the overall "system" for implementing change. 
RESULTS
System-based "factors contributing to" or "factors minimizing outcomes of" incidents and system-based "suggested corrective strategies" among the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS are listed and ranked in Table I . Some of these were also considered to have been relevant to some of the human error categories (e.g. "additional training" is of relevance as a strategy to reduce "knowledge-based" errors, but is also a system-based solution to a problem). 12 At least one of the "system-based" factors listed in Table 1 was "ticked" for 1794 (90070) of the first 2000 incidents (520 (26070) for "factors contributing", 1125 (56070) for "factors minimizing outcome" and 1295 (65070) for "suggested corrective strategies"). If human behaviour Anae~'{hesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, .'\la. 5, October, 1993 DISCUSSION is included as part of the "system", then at least one of the "factors contributing" in Table 1 (p. 679") was "ticked" for 1615 (81070) of all incidents, at least one of the "factors minimizing outcome" in the Appendix (p. 691) was ticked for 1599 (80%) of incidents, and at least one of the' 'suggested corrective strategies" in Table 3 (p. 679 12 ) was ticked for 1458 (73%) of incidents. Overall, at least one of these factors in Tables 1-3 (p. 679 12 ) was ticked for 1942 (97%) of the 2000 incidents. Some aspects of clinical practice were identified for strategy development or implementation; these are listed in the Appendix. An outline of the overall "system" involving AIMS reporting pathways is shown in Figure 2 .
AIMS reporters considered that a system-based deficiency directly contributed to one-quarter of problems (four-fifths if human factors are included), that some aspect of the system minimized the adverse outcome in over half of all cases (four-fifths if human factors are included), and that in two-thirds (threequarters if human factors are included), a system-based strategy would be helpful for a similar problem in the future; the system was thought to have been important or to be potentially important in 90% of incidents (97% if human factors are included). this will define how contributing factors are to be classified. The classification of "failure to check equipment" and "inadequate preoperative assessment of the patient" in this symposium as "rule-based" human errors rather than violations of the system reflects the perception of a body of anaesthetists of the minor role of the system in this area. In aviation, the system is perceived to play a more dominant role; it requires the pilot to check equipment before' 'takeoff". Failure by the pilot to check important equipment would be regarded not just as a "rule-based error" but as a conscious violation of a required protocol. The "severity" of a judgement on the individual's role in producing an adverse outcome will depend on where in the spectrum of behaviour such an omission is perceived to lie: a subconscious slip or lapse (due possibly to distraction at a crucial moment); a rulebased error (the habitual but benign-in-intent application of an inadequate checking routine); a violation (proceeding with the conscious knowledge that a check of a vital item of equipment had not been carried out); sabotage (actively interfering with or degrading the system).8 To include sabotage in the spectrum of behaviour of anaesthetists or pilots may seem extreme. However, there have been instances of pilots and anaesthetists deliberately and consciously disabling important alarms because they find them "irritating". Instances were reported in the first 2000 incidents in which this was done without the knowledge of the anaesthetist directly responsible for the patient.
It is likely that the anaesthesia "system" will become progressively less tolerant of such behaviour; disabling an alarm will be seen in the future to be less a benign idiosyncrasy and more a manifestation of unprofessional behaviour. The reality is that as the complexity of our working environment increases, particularly if working as part of a team, it becomes necessary to adhere more faithfully to protocols and prescribed procedures. This does not degrade the autonomy of the individual but simply reflects the application of safe work practices in a complex system; manifestly unsafe practices should not be tolerated under the banner of "clinical freedom' '. Even by current perceptions, the AIMS data show that the system per se is important or potentially important in 90070 of problems; if human behaviour is included, this rises to 97070. Regardless of whether or not all human error should be regarded as part of the "system", attempts to modify the incidence and nature of human error will have to emanate from the system. An attempt to depict AIMS reporting pathways, and the organizations that are currently involved in developing and implementing strategies to improve the system and help to prevent and/or reduce the impact of incidents and accidents, is shown in Figure 2 . Feedback loops are represented in Figure 2 at four levels.
Level I involves the use of AIMS reports by individuals, hospitals and group practices for audit purposes at a local level. There are many hospitals that now have regular meetings at which individual incidents and collated data from AIMS reports are presented and discussed. Many useful strategies may be developed at this level.
Level II involves AIMS participants sending forms to the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF). The process of editing and data input, storage and retrieval has been described elsewhere in this symposium. 11 Collated information is then sent back to contributors by APSF newsletters; also, queries by AIMS reporters are answered by telephone or facsimile. There has been feedback that this information has been useful in obtaining equipment, facilitating change and increasing the awareness of anaesthetists of the types of problems they may encounter.
Recently AIMS became one of three initial pilot studies of the National "Health Communications Network", an initiative of the Federal and State Ministers of Health for setting up systems for facilitating the transfer and processing of health information. Ten AIMS contributor organizations (including one large teaching hospital in each State and a large private practice group) have been supplied with computers and the appropriate software has been developed to send incidents to the APSF electronically, where the data are automatically incorporated into the national database. Each contributor is able to access a progressively updated record of their AIMS' 'profile" and compare it to the national one. The APSF cannot identify the subset of data from each contributor, thus guaranteeing complete anonymity. Using the Health Communications Network, feedback is obtained by the reporting organization within a few days, compared with several months for the "paper-based" system used by most contributors. This electronic system can accommodate contributors from other countries as the computer network is a world-wide one.
Level III involves interaction between AIMS and the major professional bodies representing anaesthetists in Australia -the Australian Society of Anaesthetists (ASA), and the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists (ANZCA). AIMS data have been presented at both regional and national scientific meetings of these bodies, APSF meetings have been held as part of or in association with these meetings and there has been major support and/or funding of AIMS by these bodies. The APSF now has a formal mechanism for communication with ANZCA via its representation on the ANZCA Continuing Education and Quality of Practice Committee.
There has been some debate as to whether the APSF or AIMS should be an intrinsic part of the ASA or ANZCA. However, the APSF was originally set up to become involved in all patient safety matters, not just those pertinent to anaesthesia, IJ and it is also believed that AIMS should be kept at "arm's-length" from bodies primarily representing anaesthetists rather than patients. Regardless of the excellent track-records and intentions of the ASA and ANZCA, there will inevitably be cynics who perceive that they may not publish matters potentially damaging to the image of the anaesthetist. The model for national audit machinery being independent but closely associated with professional bodies is well established elsewhere (for example, the National Confidential Inquiry into Peri-operative Deaths). III Level IV involves interaction between AIMS, APSF, ASA and ANZCA and several national and international agencies. The APSF has been involved in setting up incident monitoring as part of the accreditation of anaesthetists in rural hospitals in one State of Australia; this may occur in others. After making a submission to the Professional Indemnity Review of the Department of Health, Housing and Social Security, the APSF has had an association with that review. The Professional Indemnity Review has funded an APSF incident monitoring meeting as well as pilot incident monitoring projects in several other specialties. The APSF is providing a co-ordinating role for each of these pilot studies which are under way in general practice, psychiatry, gastroenterology, intensive care, emergency medicine and obstetrics and gynaecology; each study has the support of the relevant representative professional body.
There have been discussions with various Medical Defence organizations, and representatives have attended and contributed to APSF meetings. AIMS data have provided information of use to the International Task Force for Anaesthesia Patient Safety in promulgating international safety standards for anaesthesia." Recommendations arising from AIMS have been made by the APSF and adopted by the Standards Australia Organization as well as by the International Standards Organization with respect to aspects of equipment and machine design. There is also a direct link between the APSF and the Quality of Practice Committee of the World Federation of Societies of Anaesthetists via a common President and Chairman, respectively. Links have recently been strengthened between the APSF and the Therapeutic Devices Evaluation Committee (TDEC) so that problems with equipment can be addressed more efficiently. The APSF communicates both directly and via TDEC with the medical devices and equipment industry, which has a representative on the APSF Board. It is interesting that "pure" equipment problems constitute only 9070 of the total; however, problems at the interface between equipment and human behaviour comprise over two-thirds of all incidents (38070 involve problems with circuitry disconnections, leaks, misconnections, valves, absorbers and ventilators) and 30070 involve problems with other equipment (e.g. monitors, infusion pumps). It is planned to continue to interact with the medical equipment and devices industry to improve the many deficiencies identified at this interface.
Because of these links, the APSF has been able to respond promptly to problems arising within the system; many problems have been solved rapidly at an informal level. For example, a problem was reported involving a defect in rotameter assembly which led to the delivery of hypoxic gas mixtures; after a phone call to the manufacturer, the assembly process was altered to prevent this from recurring. It was noted that a "cluster" of events occurred following the introduction of ventilators with "a stand-by mode". Anaesthetists were failing to recommence ventilation of the patients and reactivate all the alarms because there was no obvious recurring reminder that everything had been inactivated. Addressing this problem necessitated communication with both the manufacturer and TDEC.
If the electronic transfer and automatic processing of reports becomes more widespread and undergoes several projected improvements, rapid feedback of potential problems can be provided at a national level; it is also likely that immediate feedback of collated data, local and national, will enhance the audit process. This will also provide a means for reporters to be asked to provide additional information about particular types of problems (anonymously, if necessary).
On-going collaboration is planned with similar surveillance and CQI projects in other complex systems. The Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, in a joint project with the Canadian Transportation Safety Board, is developing an advanced computer-based "Occurrence Analysis and Safety Information System" (OASIS) which is an integral part of the operation of the Bureau. I' OASIS allows computer-based matching of characteristics of incidents so that associations and "clusters" of factors can be detected automatically. OASIS is also using the "Reason model", which is the basis for the classification of incidents by AIMS. " Central to this model is the concept of the "organizational accident" and the notion that "latent failures" in the system should be detected early and rectified before adverse circumstances catalysed by an inevitable human or component failure convert onc into a disaster.
However, it may be that the most important yield from AIMS is that "snapshots" may be obtained on an on-going basis of the current status of almost any aspect of clinical anaesthetic practice: the pattern of monitor usage with its advantages and disadvantages; how crises such as anaphylaxis or air embolism are presenting and how they are being managed; what equipment needs to be modified to prevent inadvertent use in a dangerous way; what information should be added to the knowledge-base of anaesthetists (e.g. "40070 of all desaturations are due to endobronchial intubation"; "the stethoscope may fail to detect oesophageal or endobronchial intubation"). Some topics for consideration for strategy development and implementation have been listed in the Appendix.
Some of these are best dealt with at a local or department level (e.g. organizing rosters so that anaesthetists do not have to start elective lists when sleep-deprived); many of these are intuitively obvious, but the AIMS data show that they need to be specifically addressed. Others will require co-ordinated effort on a larger scale (e.g. persuading syringe manufacturers to produce syringes with colour-coded plungers; modifying "high" alarms on oxygen analysers), and yet others will require formulation of policies by a body such as ANZCA (e.g. what the standard essential alarm settings should be).
A major advantage of AIMS is that representative detailed qualitative information may be obtained about all aspects of our complex system. Analysis of the first 2000 incidents has been crude and empirical. However, it is apparent that even at this early stage of development, AIMS represents a powerful tool for anaesthetists, collectively, to further improve the quality of their practice.
A problem facing those conducting research into the failure of complex systems has been that funding has been forthcoming only for very dangerous, highly sophisticated systems (nuclear power stations, railway control systems). Anaesthesia provides a wonderfully "error-rich" domain and as such has the potential to constitute a valuable resource for research in this important area. It is intended to build on existing alliances with cognitive psychologists and human error experts in anaesthesia as well as other disciplines; AIMS has the potential not only to play a vital practical role in the continued enhancement of the quality of anaesthetic practice, but also to provide a valuable resource for research at the increasingly important interface between human behaviour and complex systems.
Topics for consideralion for developmenl or implementalion
Suggested Improvement I. Add to the knowledge-base a basic undeNanding of the factors contributing to errors, incidents and accidents. H 2. Develop and apply a generic classification of the factors contributing to errors, incidents and accidents. 5 -9 3. Continue liaison with medico-Iegal experts to improve mutual understanding and promote rational behaviour in this area. s 4. Arrange for anaesthetists not to have to start elective lists after inadequate sleep.5 5. A time beyond which non-urgent cases cannot start should be established by con census and enforced. 6. Redesign the AIMS reporting form in the light of our increased understanding. " 7. Redesign the AIMS form with a "core" component suitable for international use. I1 8. Redesign the AIMS form to further facilitate the automatic classification, processing and feedback of data. " 9. Design and co-ordinate randomised prospective studies of selected areas of pratice using the "POS" network. " 10. Promote the use of the recommended arrays of monitors whenever practicable. "." 11. Establish an updated, structured, full check list for checking equipment and monitors. 16 12. Establish quick-check protocols for equipment, monitors and drugs before each case. 16 ApPENDIX (cont.)
Establish a protocol for the audible "bleep" of the oximeter to be relied upon whenever practicable instead of that of the ECG. " 15. Establish a standard, minimum set of monitor alarms and the level at which they must "sound" (e.g. high-pressure circuit alarms, low-inspired oxygen alarm, saturation alarm, apnoea alarms). These alarms should be non-cancellable or have set time-limited "mute" facilities." 16. Require an obvious signal to be displayed (e.g. flashing light, intermittent "bleep") when any of these alarms (see 15 above) are in the "mute" or "standby" mode. " 17. Require an obvious continuous indication if any of the limits at which these alarms will "sound" have been changed. " 18. Include the classification of anaesthesia incidents into "clinical situations" in the redesigned AIMS form. 11,16 19 . Ensure a supply of functioning spare monitors so that any malfunctioning monitor can be replaced without delay. i6 20. All oximeters should have a modulated tone with saturation changes and a low level alarm (see 15-17 above). 17 
Add to the knowledge-base new information about the applications and limitations
of the oximeter. I' 22. A protocol should be established for the use, whenever practicable, of capnography to check the placement of every endotracheal tube, and for the use of a capnograph for every ventilated patient undergoing anaesthesia. 18 
of the capnograph. " 24. A "kit" should be developed to facilitate checking of the machine and monitors at the start of the day (e.g. with a carbon dioxide cylinder for checking the capnograph, and a large syringe for checking the spirometer). 18 
of the electrocardiograph (ECG), particularly with respect to ischaemia detection and insensitivity to hypoxia, hypercarbia and acidosis. 19 
of blood pressure measurement, particularly the potential for misleading information from indirect methods. 20 27. Promote the use of an oxygen analyser whenever an anaesthetic machine is used." 28. Document the siting and calibration of the oxygen analyser, and record inspired oxygen concentration every 5 minutes during anaesthesia." 29. Modify the oxygen analyser "high" alarm so it has a "mute" facility and is not as intrusive as the "low" alarm." 30. Add to the knowledge base new information about the applications and limitations of the oxygen analyser. 2 I 31. Add to the knowledge-base new information about the applications and limitations of the stethoscope. 22 32. Crisis management algorithms and sub-algorithms should be developed and be in a readily accessible manual on each machine.2J 33. Anaesthetists should all be taught a basic crisis management algorithm." 34. Anaesthetists should be tested on the application of a basic crisis management algorithm, preferably with the use of sophisticated simulation." 35. Ensure that a well-understood line of communication is available whenever an anaesthetist needs help. This should preferably be tested regularly and should be a dedicated system (e.g. an intercom for this purpose).2J 36. A post-disaster protocol should be readily available and should be used after any significant morbidity or death.2J 37. Ensure there is a separate, spare independent means of ventilating the patients' lungs at all times (including operating theatre, transfer, recovery ward, organ imaging, etc.).2J 38. Ensure that there is an emergency supply of oxygen independent of the wall supply, anaesthetic machine and breathing circuit. 2J 39. Ensure there is an alternative means available for anaesthetising any patient who has to be removed from an anaesthetic machine.21 40. Establish a structured check list for the pre-operative assessment of patients." 41. Establish a structured check list for the pre-operatuive preparation of patients." Suggested Improvement 42. Establish a mechanism for informing all anaesthetists if the packaging or supplier of an anaesthetic drug has changed, preferably with colour photographs of the "old" and "new" side by side." 43. Establish a controlled system for organising, storing, restocking, drawing up, labelling and administering drugs." 44. Establish standard protocols whenever reasonable for dilutions, labels and means of administration of drugs." 45. Consider adopting the US ASTM colour code protocol." 46. Colour code the tips of ampoules for classes of drugs." 47. Arrange for colour coding of the plungers of syringes for classes of drugs." 48. Design and use physical templates for drug storage and stock contro!''' 49. An assessment of the airway and degree of difficulty with intubation should be documented on a structured pre-anaesthetic form for each patient." 50. Establish a protocol that anaesthetists should make sure that skilled assistance is immediately available when about to anaesthetise any patient with a suspected difficult intubation." 51. A difficult intubation trolley, including equipment for gaining direct acccess to the trachea should be immediately available. 26 52. Add to the knowledge-base new information about the association of difficult ventilation with difficult intubation." 53. Develop and teach a routine for "failed intubation"." 54. Add to the knowledge-base that the endotracheal tube should be considered whenever the capnograph signal disappeares (oesophageal intubation, obstruction, unintended extubation) as well as circulatory, circuitry and gas sampling problems.' , 55. Add to the knowledge-base the new information about the nature and frequency of problems with the endotracheal tube.28 56. Establish and teach a standard "trouble-shootin g" procedure for problems with the endotraceal tube.'" 57. Establish a protocol for confirming the position of the cuff of the endotracheal tube in relation to the larynx; encourage manufacturers to place a series of numbered marks immediately above the cuff." 58. Establish a protocol for documentation of the distance of the tip of the endotracheal tube from the teeth or gums. Persuade all manufacturers to provide appropriate markings on endotracheal tubes." 59. Establish a standard method for securing the endotracheal tube.'" 60. Ensure the use of two ventilation monitors (e.g., two of capnograph, low pressure alarm, spirometer) with appropriate alarms, backed up by oximetry, whenever mechanical artificial ventilation of the lungs is undertaken." 61. Do not allow "one-off" modifications or items of equipment to be readily available for common use. Standardise equipment as far as possible." 62. Modify the scavenging hose connecting the spill valve of the circle system so that it cannot be connected to the scavenging outlet of the ventilator. 29 63. Modify the common gas outlet so that circuits are either "on" or "off"." 64. Render the gas line and connections between the common gas outlet and the circle system secure from disruption." 65. Add to the knowledge-base the new information about the relative frequency and nature of problems at different sites of the breathing circuit." 66. Add to the knowledge-base information about the failure of anaesthetists to respond immediately in an appropriate manner to approximately half the cases of anaphylactic reaction." 67. Establish a protocol for the treatment of anaphylaxis. 
Requirements

APPENDIX (cont.)
Suggested Improvement 72. Always use a nerve stimulator in patients with severe systemic disease to assess recovery of neuromuscular function." 73. Always monitor the adequacy of ventilation of patients in transit." 74. Position unconsciou,> patients on their side and/or remain \\ ith the patient and support the jaw." 75. Consider monitoring the EeC, in all patient.s receiving su~amethonlum." 70. Limit the maximum inspired halothane concentration during induction of small children.' , 77. Inject a potentially toxic dose of local anaesthetic slowl) or in increments during regional blochade.· n. Take care to flush drugs from the dead-space of injection ports 01 use a no deadspace technique." 79. Add to the knowledge-base nev\ information about the source, presentation and outcome of gas embolism." SO. Establish a protocol for managing gas embolism." HI. Add to the knowledge-base new information about the source, presentation and outcome of pneumothorax." S2. Ensure that equipment is readily available for thc emergenc) drainage of pneumot horaces. " X3. Add to the knowledge-base the source, nature and outcome of common problems with regional anaesthesia." S4. Establish and use a protocol for monitoring patients undergoing regional anaesthesia. " H5. Establish protocols for managing the common complications of regional anaesthesia. " So. Design and carry out prospective studies to determine the incidence and outcomes of problems in the recovery ward." H7. Establish a forum for discussion about v\ het her av\arene", should be part of informed consent. '" 88. Establish a protocol to record the concentration of volatile agents and the inspired oxygen concentration at five-minute intenals on the anaesthetic chart.'" 89. Establish a protocol for thc management of patients vvho arc suspected of having suffered awareness or have complained of having suffered alvareness. '" 90. Add to the knowledge-base new information about the type and range of physical injuries to which patients undergoing anaesthesia may be subjected to.'-91. Add to the structured pre-anaesthetic form documentation that the dental history of the patient has been obtained.'-92. Establish a protocol for eye care.'-93. Establish a protocol for the prevention of nccdle .stich II1juries. 94. Establish a protocol for the management of needle stick injuries.' 95. Establish formal local systems for documenting problems with equipment or work practices.' . 97. Establish protoco!s for checking correct placement of the tips of intravascular catheters. " 98. Add to the knowledge-base thc e~tent and potential selerity of problems a"ociated with vascular access." 99. Develop standard protocols for the insertion 01' central lines that include someone sitting with a "finger on the pulse"." lOO. Establish a system vV' hereby all anaesthetish arc checked at intervals with rcspect to their know ledge of the anaesthetic machine and monitor checks, and their ability to use a monitor and defibrillator." 101. Have a system for checking the emergency pOlvcr and lighting at intcnals.'" 102. Arrange for separate battery-operated light sources to be available v\ herever patients may be anaesthetised.'" 103. Ensure that there is battery back-Up for essential monitors and emergency local power for vital life-support systems (e.g., cardiopulmonary bypass machincq.'" 104. Put a requirement in place for an anaesthetist to al\\ays be pl'Cscnt when the composition and function of gas pipelincs are checked after an) work on them or interruption to the gas sllpply.'" ApPENDIX (cont.)
Requirements
Suggested Improvement Requirements A E D K P L 105. Arrange for two functioning laryngoscope to be immediately available for any intubation, with a further two readily accessible as back-ups.40 106. The thermo-mechanical cut-out of any heating device which may be used in association with a patient should be regularly "exercised" (e.g., for blood warmers, humidifiers and heating devices)." * 107. Establish a protocol for checking the alternative independent means of ventilating a patient at the start of each day." 108. Establish simulator-based testing procedures for problems shown to be important in clinical anaesthetic practice, and work towards setting up simulator-based testing centres. 12 109. Establish a protocol for handling all staff and relatives after a disaster. 12 110. Establish a protocol for handling all equipment after a disaster. 12 Ill. Establish a mechanism for handling the compromised anaesthetist. 12 * A: Administrative action or change in work prcatice required. E: Equipment needed. D: Design change or equipment modification needed. K: Knowledge-base improvement needed; feed into the syllabus and the education system. P: Protocol needs to be developed and made freely available or incorporated into patient documentation as a check list. L: Liaison with other bodies needed (e.g., ANZCA, ASA) for advice, consensus and incorporation into guidelines or recommendations if appropriate.
